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I introduce “nomic-role nonreductionism” as an alternative to causal-role functionalism 
in the philosophy of mind. It is inspired by recent trends in cognitive science that emphasize 
embodied cognition and multi-level methods of explanation in the special sciences. While 
causal-role functionalists identify mental properties by an intra-level transition theory that 
describes relations between inputs, internal mental states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify 
mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that includes inter-level facts about 
realization from the appropriate implementation sciences. Thus mental properties are understood 
by a broad network that includes a horizontal dimension of intra-level causal relations as well as 
a vertical dimension of inter-level realization relations. To set the stage, in section 1 I describe 
the popular second-order version of causal-role functionalism. In section 2 I present the 
alternative nomic-role nonreductionism. In section 3 I support this view by an argument that 
generalizes upon an imputed rationale for scientific versions of causal-role functionalism. In 
section 4 I consider some possible problems. Then in section 5 I describe a general account of 
property identity that utilizes the same picture of causal and realization relations. 
 
I. CAUSAL PROFILING BY AN INTRA-LEVEL TRANSITION THEORY 
 
Consider the familiar second-order version of causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of 
mind. Very briefly, mental properties are understood by their position within a psychological 
theory that describes mentally-relevant causal transactions. Formulated as a Ramsey postulate, 
the theory is a conjunctive sentence that expresses all laws that govern causal relationships 
between types of inputs, mental states, and outputs within a cognitive system, here abbreviated 
as ‘T(I1 ... In, M1 ... Mn, O1 ... On).’ Mental properties are then understood to be the second-order 
properties of having first-order physical properties that occupy the corresponding causal roles 
described by T (by saying that the latter are physical properties, I mean to confine the discussion 
to physically-acceptable versions of second-order causal-role functionalism). Put in the simplest 
way, where the term ‘Mi’ represents some mental property, and where ‘playing role Ri’ means 
occupying that ith position in theory T (being the value of ‘Mi’ in the Ramsey postulate or ‘Fi’ in 
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any Ramsey formula generated from the postulate by replacing mental terms by property 
variables), second-order causal-role functionalists claim that having that mental property is the 
property of having some physical property that occupies causal role Ri. More generally, the 
second-order functionalist schema is this: 
 
(F) Mi = the (second-order) property of having some (first-order physical) property that 
 occupies causal role Ri. 
1 
   
Although causal-role functionalism provides the clearest contrast to the view I want to 
develop, various kinds of functionalists have been united in the view that the pertinent roles 
involve relations between input properties, mental properties, output properties, and nothing 
more. This is true about machine functionalists who understand mental properties in terms of the 
operations described by the appropriate computer program, as well as causal-role functionalists 
who understand mental properties in terms of the roles described by the appropriate 
psychological theory. This is true about commonsense-based analytic functionalists who utilize a 
priori methods to discover the common meanings of mental terms, as well as scientific-based 
psychofunctionalists who utilize a posteriori methods to discover the empirical truths about the 
mind. And this is true about first-order functionalists who are reductive physicalists, as well as 
second-order functionalists who are nonreductive physicalists. So Hilary Putnam says that the 
machine states of a mind are “related to one another and to the motor outputs and the sensory 
inputs,” David Lewis refers to “causal relations among mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor 
responses,” Ned Block frames the theory by which one identifies mental state types in terms of  
“a mental state, input, and output,” and Sydney Shoemaker appeals to “causal facts about mental 
states -- about their relations to inputs, outputs, and one another.” 2  
The practice of identifying mental properties solely in terms of causally-linked input 
properties, output properties, and other mental properties is so widespread that it deserves a 
name. I call it “causal profiling.” It targets intra-level relations inasmuch as the causal processes 
from sensory inputs to mental states to behavioral outputs occur at roughly the same level of 
reality. This interpretation is quite natural given two major motivations for causal-role 
functionalism. One is a traditional picture of cognitive science pitched at a relatively high-level 
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of abstraction that ignores facts about realization and physical mechanisms from the appropriate 
implementation sciences, the other is a theory of metaphysics that employs a causally flat 
scheme of roles and their physical occupants.  
Regarding the traditional picture of cognitive science, consider two historically important 
developments that led to the rise of cognitivism. Edward Tolman postulated mental maps in rats 
because of their behavior of traveling the shortest distance to a food source contrary to their 
conditioned training and apart from speculation about how those maps are implemented in the 
brain, and Noam Chomsky postulated a language acquisition device in humans with rules 
governing syntactic transformations because of their behavior of producing sentences that outrun 
stimulus training quite apart from speculation about how language modules are implemented in 
the brain. 3 These cases illustrate a pure behaviorally based postulation of inner representations 
without consideration of neural mechanisms. This kind of “top-only” theorizing became 
integrated with classical computational models of the stated calculations and rules, which Ned 
Block describes with the example of logic gates (patterns of circuitry that implement logical 
operations):  
 
How such gates work is no more part of the domain of cognitive science than is 
the nature of the buildings that hold computer factories. This reveals a sense in 
which the computer model of the mind is profoundly un-biological. We are 
beings who have a useful and interesting biological level of description, but the 
computer model of the mind aims for a level of description of the mind that 
abstracts away from the biological realizations of cognitive structures.” 4  
 
A theory of intra-level causal roles thus fits this abstract, implementation-ignoring picture 
of cognitive science very well. Yet another way to highlight the intra-level nature of causal 
profiling is to note the kind of metaphysics it implies, namely, a flat theory of mental roles and 
physical occupants that ignores important inter-level dimensions of realization. Carl Gillett 
describes this flat view in terms of a theory of realization whereby (I) the realized and realizing 
properties are possessed by the same individual (a token identity condition), and (II) the causal 
powers that individuate the realized property are a subset of or otherwise contributed by the 
causal powers bestowed upon an individual by the realizing property (a matching of causal 
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powers condition). 5 Causal-role functionalism is flat because even second-order functionalists 
typically state that the same object instantiates both causal-role and occupant properties, as 
expressed by condition (I), and the idea that one property occupies the role of another implies a 
matching of causal powers, as expressed by condition (II), at least assuming a general 
background metaphysics of properties and powers. As Gillett explains: “Under the flat view one 
property instance contributes all the powers individuative of the realized property -- the realizer 
property instance thus literally plays the very causal role that individuates the realized   
property.” 6 
One might wonder how a theory of realization based upon the second-order 
functionalist’s role-occupant distinction could be metaphysically “flat,” given that philosophers 
have understood second-order functionalism to be a paradigm nonreductive view that implies a 
hierarchy of distinct sets of properties in nature. But one must distinguish “property orders” from 
the “causal levels” implied by talk about properties bestowing causal powers upon individuals. 
Kim makes this distinction by pointing out that while first-order and second-order properties are 
possessed by the same individual, the causal powers that create a difference in levels are 
bestowed upon different individuals as reflected in the “macro-object/micro-constituent” 
hierarchy, specifically, the properties and powers of wholes versus the different properties and 
powers of their proper parts. 7 Hence different property orders are instantiated at the same (flat) 
mereological level where the causal roles are played.   
In sum, I interpret causal-role functionalism as an intra-level transition theory because of 
the stated ties to abstract cognitive theory and a flat metaphysics of causal roles and physical 
occupation. If one wishes to recast the theory more broadly to include inter-level causation and 
multi-level methods of explanation, very well, it will become the kind of theory I develop as an 
alternative to the traditional interpretation of causal-role functionalism.  
 
II. COMPREHENSIVE PROFILING BY A TOTAL THEORY 
 
Like second-order causal role functionalism, the view I develop is a nonreductive position 
according to which mental properties are not identical to physical properties. Going beyond the 
folk dichotomy of ‘mental’ versus ‘physical,’ the nonreductive picture I accept presents nature as 
a hierarchy of distinct sets of objects and properties, reflected in the existence of general to 
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special sciences, where the properties in the domains of special sciences are typically not 
identical to but determined by or dependent upon the properties in the domains of the general 
sciences. For example, generally speaking, properties in course-grained, behaviorally-based 
functional psychology are not identical to the properties described by finer-grained theories of 
neuro-computation, and they in turn are not identical to the properties described in neuro-
chemistry and still more general chemical theories, and they in turn are not identical to the 
properties described in basic physics. This is not the place to argue for this kind of nonreductive 
position. It is here assumed, save some expository comments that serve to indicate the kind and 
level of property in question. 8 For the many reductive physicalists I beg their indulgence. A 
nonreductive alternative to second-order causal-role functionalism is worth exploring, at least 
until the tide of future science turns wholly against nonreductive theories of mind. I believe the 
waters are still favorable.  
Beginning at the low end of the mind’s place within this world-hierarchy of property 
levels, mental properties of the kind described by functional psychology are typically determined 
by but not identical to lower-level neuro-computational, neuro-chemical, or other physical 
properties because mental properties are typically multiply realized by those properties. 9 Let the 
term “underputs” name these lower-level physical properties that serve to realize mental 
properties. Given the determinative nature of realization, there are inter-level laws of the form: 
‘necessarily, if P then M,’ where ‘P’ names a physical underput property and ‘M’ names a 
mental property. Such laws constitute part of M’s realization role, and they will be included in 
the theory T by which M is understood. 
Concerning the intersection at the high end of the mind’s place within the world-
hierarchy, various still higher-level psychological, moral, and social properties are determined by 
but not identical with mental properties because those properties are likewise multiply realized 
by mental properties. For example, utilizing a broadly Lockean theory of personal identity, the 
property of being a person is multiply realized by different psychological profiles, which is to 
say, different mixtures of rationality, consciousness, and similar cognitive capacities. More 
central to the scientific literature, according to trait theories in psychology, a human personality 
is itself built from various mixtures and dimensions of component psychological factors and so 
multiply realized by them. 10 Let the term “overouts” name those higher-level properties that 
more basic mental properties serve to realize. Since overouts are thus determined by mental 
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properties, there are inter-level laws of the form: ‘necessarily, if M then V,’ where ‘V’ names an 
overout property. Such laws also constitute part of M’s realization role, and they will be included 
in the same theory T by which M is understood. 
Parenthetically, one can accept an expanded set of laws governing underputs and 
overouts while disagreeing about exactly how one should interpret such realization laws. The 
standard view is that, because of multiple realizability, a given physical underput property P is a 
lawfully sufficient but not necessary condition for M. But elsewhere I have argued that in order 
to account for the converse of multiple realizability, one should view the physical realizing 
property P as an INUS condition for M. 11 And there are more familiar debates over local versus 
regional versus global determination, pace the literature on supervenience. Accordingly, 
philosophers have also begun to speak about broader forms of realization by determinative 
conditions outside the individual. 12 Even so, the view I want to develop that utilizes a scheme of 
inter-level realization laws can be maintained by those who hold different views about the form 
and nature of those realization laws, just as a version of causal-role functionalism that utilizes a 
scheme of intra-level causal laws can be maintained by those who hold different views about the 
form and nature of those causal laws.    
In any case, the set of laws connecting a specific mental property M to its input 
properties, other mental properties, and output properties, constitutes a horizontal cross-section 
of M’s nomic relations. This is the property’s intra-level causal role. The set of laws connecting 
M to its underput properties, other mental properties, and overout properties, constitutes a 
vertical cross-section of M’s nomic relations. This is the property’s inter-level realization role. 
And the set of all such laws constitutes M’s total nomic role. As a consequence, there are two 
Ramsey postulates to consider. There is the Ramsey postulate composed by the conjunction of 
all intra-level causal roles involving mental properties, which I call a “Causal Theory of Mind.” 
There is also the Ramsey postulate composed by the conjunction of all total nomic roles 
involving mental properties, which I call a “Total Theory of Mind,” here abbreviated as: ‘T(P1 ... 
Pn, I1 ... In, M1 ... Mn, O1 ... On, V1 ... Vn),’ with the additional P and V terms representing types 
of underputs and overouts, respectively.  
Utilizing a Ramsey postulate with a larger set of laws than Causal T is not unprecedented. 
David Mellor says that the actual properties of the world are those quantified over by a Ramsey 
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postulate that contains “all laws.” 13 Total T is more modest in extension, containing only the 
subset of laws that involve mental properties. To borrow some terminology from Robert 
Cummins, Total T is a combination of a causal transition theory and the underlying property 
instantiation theories that target mental properties as well as their higher-level overout properties, 
yielding a full picture of horizontal and vertical nomic relations that center upon the life of the 
mind. 14 I will have much more to say about the interpretation of Total T shortly. But I am now 
in a position to present an alternative to causal-role functionalism that identifies mental 
properties by Total T. I call this practice “comprehensive profiling” and the resulting philosophy 
“nomic-role nonreductionism.” Where ‘playing role Ri’ now means occupying that ith position in 
Total T (being the value of ‘Mi’ in the Ramsey postulate or ‘Fi’ in any Ramsey formula generated 
from the postulate by replacing mental terms by property variables), the schema for nomic-role 
nonreductionism is:  
 
(N) Mi = the (first-order mental) property that occupies total nomic role Ri. 
15 
 
Several points of clarification are in order. First, definition (N) says that mental property 
Mi is identical to the property that occupies total nomic role Ri. Consequently this is a first-order 
schema, because mental property Mi is the property that occupies the pertinent ith position in 
Total T, not some second-order property of having some first-order physical property that 
occupies that position (recall the difference between “orders” and “levels” discussed in the 
previous section). Why is a first-order scheme now acceptable for a nonreductive philosophy of 
mind? Because there is no longer any need to use the logico-metaphysical machinery of second-
order properties, since the difference between mental and physical properties is now manifest 
within the theory T itself by virtue of the inter-level realization laws connecting them. Mental 
properties are assigned to the mental terms ‘M1 ... Mn,’ as well as any property variables that 
replace them, while physical properties are assigned to the physical input terms ‘P1 ... Pn,’ as 
well as any property variables that replace them. To turn a phrase from Bishop Butler, everything 
is what it is, and not in the place of another.  
Since the nomic-role nonreductivist does not assign first-order physical properties as the 
value of the variables that replace mental terms, the functionalist doctrine of physical occupation 
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is rejected. Indeed, to accept it within a scheme that utilizes Total T would lead to contradiction. 
George Bealer makes roughly this point in a footnote of a paper devoted to a different issue with 
functionalism. Where ‘T’ is the Ramsey postulate, and ‘T’ is the set of Ramsey predicates 
formed from T, and ‘R’ is the set of first-order physical properties that satisfy T, Bealer says:  
 
But there are limitations on how comprehensive T may be. If T includes too much 
information about the standard mental properties, functionalism is subject to 
immediate refutation. For example, suppose T includes a clause stating that, say, 
the property of being in pain is not a first-order physical property (having firing 
C-fibers, etc.), as is required by the denial of the identity thesis. And so on for the 
other standard mental properties dealt with by T. In that case, there could be no 
first-order physical properties R that satisfy T, contradicting the materialistic 
version of functionalism. 16 
 
Simply put, if T says that mental properties differ from physical properties in a certain 
respect, then physical properties cannot play that mental role of differing from physical 
properties since no property can differ from itself. Yet Total T is precisely the kind of 
“comprehensive T” Bealer describes, because it displays the difference between mental and 
physical properties in its inter-level realization laws. To make the point in a more precise way, 
assume that the physical properties are the underput properties within Total T. Given multiple 
realizability, for any physical underput P and mental property M, there is a set of laws which 
show that P is not a necessary condition for M (e.g., Total T might introduce P and other 
alternate realizations that are equally sufficient for M as distinct neural properties by means of 
different developmental laws that govern brain plasticity). So for specific properties Mi and Pi in 
the network of laws described by Total T, start with the Ramsey postulate ‘T( … Pi => Mi,  Mi 
≠> Pi, …),’ which highlights the part of Total T that represents Pi as lawfully sufficient but not 
necessary for Mi. Then generate the Ramsey sentence ‘…∃ Fi ... [T( … Pi => Fi,  Fi ≠> Pi, …)],’ 
which is the same part of Total T with ‘Mi’ replaced by the property variable ‘Fi’ and prefixed by 
an existential quantifier. The semantics for Total T requires that physical underput properties P1 
... Pn are the value of its P-terms, which is why Pi is assigned to the term ‘Pi.’ But by the 
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functionalist doctrine of physical occupation, that same Pi would be assigned to the property 
variable ‘Fi’ that replaced ‘Mi,’ since it is the physical property that realizes Mi by virtue of 
occupying its role in the pertinent contextually-relevant situation. Hence ‘Pi => Pi’ and ‘Pi ≠> 
Pi.’ The use of Total T thus calls for a radical departure from functionalist doctrines.  
Second, let me clarify the interpretation of Total T as a combination of intra-level causal 
transition theories and inter-level property instantiation theories. As discussed previous, I view 
Causal T as an intra-level transition theory motivated by abstract cognitive theory and a flat 
metaphysics of causal roles and physical occupants. In contrast, I view Total T as an inter-level 
expansion on Causal T motivated by theories of embodied cognition and a dimensioned 
metaphysics of property instantiation or realization. Beginning with the former, many 
contemporary cognitive theories are no longer exclusively pitched at a relatively high-level of 
abstraction that ignores the facts about physical mechanisms described in lower-level realization 
sciences. Rather, the theories in question integrate traditional high-level data from functional 
psychology with lower-level data relevant to issues of physical implementation and embodiment 
from the various fields of cognitive neuroscience, animal cognition, and robotic engineering.  
To mention just a few sample cases, consider neuropsychologists David Milner and 
Melvyn Goodale’s “two systems” theory of vision in which postulates a perceptual system 
located in the ventral stream that passes from the primary visual cortex to the temporal lobe, 
providing visual categorization and learning such as recognizing shapes, and an action system 
located in the dorsal stream that passes from the primary visual cortex to the parietal lobe, 
providing visual control of action such as grasping and manipulating objects. 17 One of the many 
sources of evidence comes from individuals with visual agnosia who have damage to the 
temporal but not parietal lobes. As a result they cannot recognize objects by categorizing them in 
terms of shapes even though their sensory-motor skills for grasping the appropriate shapes is 
unaffected. For present purposes, the important point is that the theory involves a specific 
neurophysical hypothesis about two separate processing channels in the human and primate brain 
which explains the separate functioning of visual perception and visually-guided action. It is a 
theory of visual functions by divided mechanisms.  
Or consider a current theory of visual consciousness. Several neuroscientists maintain 
that visual consciousness in humans and other like-embodied mammals is realized by activity 
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that extends beyond the primary visual cortex V1-V2 into the intermediate-level processing areas 
V2-V5, and Jesse Prinz adds that representations from that processing must be made available to 
working memory through an attention mechanism. 18 The combined picture contains relatively 
low-level data about cellular activity at specific regions of the brain and relatively high-level 
psychological processes of memory and attention. Specifically, and with an eye to filling out the 
different parts of Total T, the hypothesis about intermediate-level processing in areas V2-V5 is 
committed to the specific types of physical structures in V2-V5 (as opposed to the structures in 
other areas of the brain or in other types of brains or even in other forms of engineering). So 
where ‘P’ represents a structural property in areas V2-V5, and ‘M’ represents a state type for 
intermediate-level visual processing, there is an inter-level realization law of the form 
‘necessarily, P => M.’ The additional hypothesis about the processes of attention that deposit 
representations in working memory is then an intra-level causal story committed to causal laws 
of the form, ‘necessarily, M => O,’ yielding another cross-section of laws represented by Total T.  
This form of cognition is especially relevant for the expanded picture of mind that Total 
T represents, since it directly implicates cognitive capacities that arise by virtue of the naturally 
selected mechanisms that serve to realize them, like the distinct kinds of visual processing 
capacities described by Milner and Goodale that arose because of an evolved division between 
their realizing mechanisms in humans and other closely related animals. Theories of vision must 
be tailored to specific systems with the appropriate eye-to-brain connections, and similarly for 
other cognitive capacities. 19 
Granted, Total T is a “rational reconstruction” of scientific theories of embodied 
cognition. But I assume it is permissible to perform logical operations upon extant theories, and 
Total T is a logical construction of the kind laws one can find in the broader fields of 
contemporary cognitive science. Yet, in addition to scientific theories that emphasize the role of 
physical mechanisms, one can also understand the inter-level nature of Total T by a dimensioned 
metaphysical theory of realization. Again following Gillett, and in contrast to the flat 
metaphysics of causal roles with physical occupation, a dimensioned theory maintains that (I*) 
the realized and realizing properties are possessed by an individual versus its distinct constituent 
parts (a mereological condition), and (II*) the realized and realizing properties have distinct 
causal powers suited to the different albeit compositionally-related individuals that possess them 
(a compositional powers condition). 20 As I view them, dimensioned theories are a species of 
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what Cummins called a “property instantiation” theory inasmuch as they explain the instantiation 
of a property in a kind of system S by “the properties of S’s components and their mode of 
organization.” 21 Indeed, this mereology is central to the more publicized species of a property 
instantiation theory introduced to the philosophical community by Jerry Fodor and developed by 
Cummins, namely, a functional analysis wherein higher-level (realized) functional properties or 
associated capacities decompose into lower-level sub-capacities that ultimately decompose into 
simple mechanistic-level processes (the basic realizing parts). 22 Functional decomposition is just 
composition in reverse. As long as the properties in question are associated with causal 
capacities, thus involving the causal powers in Gillett’s metaphysical theory, the resulting 
functional analysis counts as a dimensioned theory of realization.  
Of course, in order to accommodate the mereological dimensions of realization, the 
domain of Total T must include not only objects but also their proper parts. This means that, 
within the set of physical underput properties described by Total T, some will belong to an object 
while others will belong to its proper parts. To make this idea more precise, one can utilize 
Kim’s notion of a micro-based physical property. 23 Let N be a micro-based physical property 
possessed by an object or system y when (a) y’s proper parts x1, …, xn possess their 
microphysical properties P1,…,Pn, (b) the possession of P1,…,Pn by x1, …, xn determines the 
possession of N by y, and (c) N is a physical property. The set of physical underput properties 
will include both micro properties and micro-based properties, thus understood. Consequently, 
when its variables are made explicit, Total T represents an expansion of Causal T not only 
because of the added dimension of properties but also because of the added mereologial 
dimension of particulars. So much for my brief sketch of nomic-role nonreductionism and its 
Total theory of an embodied mind. More needs to be said by way of clarifying and developing 
the position. And several problems need to be addressed and resolved. But first I want to provide 
some positive support. 
 
III. SUPPORTING ARGUMENT 
 
Accepting Total T is one thing, using it to understand the nature of mental properties is quite 
another. One could continue in the spirit of causal-role functionalism and abstract cognitive 
science by ignoring all reference to embodied processes and realization relations as mere matters 
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of implementation. Yet I think this general viewpoint is no longer compelling. Specifically, by 
including facts about inter-level realization, I believe Total T represents a more complete and 
comprehensive theory of mind than Causal T. Thus I find the following argument worthy of 
serious consideration: 
 
(1) Between two theories, one should understand the nature of mental properties 
by the better scientific theory of mind. 
(2) Total T is a better scientific theory of mind than Causal T because it is a more 
complete and comprehensive theory of mind. 
(3) Therefore, between Total T and Causal T, one should understand the nature of 
mental properties by Total T.  
 
Beginning with (1), functionalists do not dispute the use of theories in understanding the 
nature of mental properties. They are part of the procedure that generates schemas like (F) and 
(N) for Ramsey-style terms tied to their containing theories. However, commonsense 
functionalists will reject (1) if they believe that the only worthwhile project is to analyze folk 
concepts of the mind. For folk concepts contain little if any data from scientific theories of mind, 
which is why J.J.C. Smart could claim that his causal analysis of mind does justice to the views 
of an “ancient Greek peasant,” and why David Lewis could construct his theory of mind from 
“commonsense folk platitudes.” 24 This is not to deny that folk concepts might have a structure 
similar to scientific theories, with connections to explanatory principles and beliefs about 
scientific essences. 25 But their content is dramatically different, like the difference between folk 
physics and real physics. In any case, since my goal is to describe a mental property’s scientific 
essence rather than its nominal folk essence, I believe premise (1) is secure. In this I follow 
scientific functionalists who likewise believe that the nature of mental properties can only be 
understood by our best scientific theories. Their Causal T, as well as my Total T, makes generous 
use of large portions of scientific psychology to reveal the broadly relational nature of mental 
properties. 26    
However, in spite of agreement on (1), traditional scientific functionalists will reject 
premise (2) on grounds that the additional information contained in Total T about realization 
roles is irrelevant to the true nature of mind. Why? Because they believe in the high-level nature 
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of an abstract mind as revealed by abstract cognitive science and a flat metaphysical theory of 
realization by functional roles and physical occupation. Accordingly, they follow a conservative 
methodology whereby abstract minds are best understood by information gathered from a 
relatively narrow range of scientific disciplines committed to the same implementation-ignoring 
“top-only” methods employed within branches of classical artificial intelligence and high-level 
computational psychology. In contrast, I seek to develop a philosophical account of the inter-
level nature of an embodied mind based upon theories of embodied cognition and a dimensioned 
metaphysics of realization. Accordingly, those who accept this perspective follow a more liberal 
methodology whereby embodied minds are best understood by information gathered from many 
scientific disciplines committed to “top-down,” “bottom-up,” “mutually interactive,” and “co-
evolutionary” methods employed across the broad fields of cognitive science. 27 Who is correct? 
Perhaps both. One should be open to the possibility that humans and other cognitive 
systems may have developed more than one or even several mental systems over the long course 
of evolution. Perhaps there is an embodied mind that involves various activities like perception, 
special problem solving in specific environments, and the fast and efficient on-line motor control 
of behavior. And perhaps there is an abstract mind that involves various activities like reflection, 
general problem solving across multiple environments, and various off-line calculations for more 
leisurely behavior. If such is the case, one may take the supporting argument (1) through (3) in a 
less contentious way as a claim about the nature of properties in an embodied mind, while giving 
place for an abstract mind in the traditional functionalist theory.  
Even so, to support my claim that the properties of an embodied mind have a broader 
mental essence, and to move the debate beyond the war between abstract and embodied 
perspectives, I offer a metaphysical argument that generalizes upon the basic rationale for 
scientific versions of causal-role functionalism. My claim is that the reasons which actually 
justify including causal inputs and outputs into a theory of mental essence are also reasons that 
justify including realization underputs and overouts into a theory of mental essence. Rhetorically 
put, what is so special about causal roles versus realization roles? It is not because people are 
aware of the pertinent causal inputs and outputs but unaware of the others. That is false, and 
even if it were true, it would only be relevant to the project of defining the meaning of 
mentalistic discourse, pace commonsense functionalism. So, to state my question more precisely, 
why do scientific causal-role functionalists understand the relational nature of mental properties 
 14 
in terms of causal input properties and behavioral output properties rather then a myriad of other 
things, for example, things that do not cause mental phenomena (properties of a nearby but 
causally isolated object), or things that are only remote causes (properties of events that only 
cause the mind’s causal inputs)?  
The first set of things do not produce mental phenomena, while the second do not 
produce mental phenomena directly. So I submit that, in contrast to other things that are not 
deemed relevant to a theory of mental essence, the causal inputs and behavioral outputs are the 
items of direct mental production. Sensory inputs directly produce mental phenomena, which in 
turn directly produce other types of mental states, which in turn directly produce behavioral 
outputs. Things that lie outside this neighborhood are excluded because they are not items of 
direct mental production. 28 But the point generalizes. Lower-level underputs also directly 
produce higher-level mental phenomena, which in turn directly produce still higher-level 
overouts. There is perfect parity. Hence they should be included in a theory about the nature of 
mind. 
Of course I have used a vague and generic idea of “direct mental production” to describe 
the similarity between causal and realization roles. But the notion of mental production can be 
cashed out in various ways that preserve the generalization from causes to realizations. For 
example, the notion of directness can be understood in terms of the idea that the items of 
production are not too spatio-temporally distant from the resulting token states or events, or the 
idea that the items of production lack a significant number of similarly-scaled intermediaries 
between them and the resulting token states or events, and these ideas apply to the pertinent 
cases of causation and realization alike. Moreover, the generic notion of production can be 
understood in terms of a cluster of scientifically useful and familiar ideas such as determination 
with covering laws that support counterfactuals. And, consonant with my generalization, many 
philosophers associate both causation and realization with the same stock of metaphysical ideas 
about determination or dependency as well as laws and counterfactuals. 29  
Granted, causation and realization might differ in some respects. For example, realization 
is typically described exclusively as an inter-level relation, causation is typically not. Realization 
is typically described as a relation between properties of the same individual or compositionally-
related individuals, causation is typically not. But it is absolutely striking that the pertinent cases 
of causation and realization converge on such things as the close proximity between their tokens 
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in space and time, the determination or dependency between causal pairs and realizing pairs, the 
existence of covering laws and true counterfactuals involving their distinct properties. So I 
believe the hypothesis that best explains why scientifically-minded functionalists framed their 
theories in terms of causal inputs and outputs is that they were motivated by such matters of 
direct mental production -- matters that carry over to the case of realizing underputs and 
overouts. Hence I find the following argument persuasive: 
 
(1*) Between two theories, one should understand the nature of mental properties 
by the better theory of mental production. 
(2*) Total T is a better theory of mental production than Causal T because it is a 
more complete and comprehensive theory of mental production. 
(3*) Therefore, between Total T and Causal T, one should understand the nature 
of mental properties by Total T.  
 
Let me also say that it is perfectly understandable why a reductive first-order 
functionalists would resist the move to Total T. On their view, physical realizations do not 
produce mental phenomena, they are mental phenomena. Consequently, only the causes play a 
substantive role as independent variables for their theory of mind. But a nonreductively-minded 
philosopher does not have that luxury. On their view, the mechanisms for lower-level underputs 
also play a substantive role as independent variables for a theory of mind. Hence I believe 
nomic-role nonreductionism and its practice of comprehensive profiling by Total T is a more 
natural development of the nonreductive perspective than its second-order functionalist 
competitor.  
Even so, I should emphasize that while nomic-role nonreductionism goes beyond causal-
role functionalism in certain important respects, it is not altogether foreign. First, like causal-role 
functionalism, nomic-role nonreductionism accepts the relational nature of mentality. It simply 
understands the nature of mental properties by a broader set of properties and relations. Second, 
like second-order causal-role functionalism, nomic-role nonreductionism expresses the physical 
irreducibility of mental properties. It simply expresses the desired irreducibility by using Total T 
under a first-order interpretation of its mental and physical terms rather than Causal T under a 
second-order interpretation of its mental terms. Third, like scientific versions of causal-role 
 16 
functionalism, nomic-role nonreductionism respects the nomic status of at least large portions of 
psychological theory. Total T is a collection of laws, not folk platitudes, or assumptions for agent 
interpretation, and so on.  
 
IV. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 
 
I admit there are various areas of concern, especially given the nascent status of my view. So I 
will discuss three concerns that I hope will further clarify nomic-role nonreductionism.  
First Concern: Supplementary Metaphysics. I have explicitly rejected the functionalist 
idea that physical properties realize mental properties by occupying their causal roles. So how do 
I define realization? 30 Fortunately, there are several alternate theories that do not presuppose the 
functionalist doctrine of physical occupation, and a nomic-role nonreductivist is free to choose 
among them. I have already mentioned Gillett’s dimensioned theory of realization that explicitly 
rejects the flat view of causal roles and physical occupation. And there are other functionally-
independent notions of realization, such as the idea of realizing properties as determinables and 
realizing properties as their determinates, or a more generic notion of determination over the 
same individual or compositionally-related individuals. 31 
Second Concern: Theoretical Differentiation. Yet one might argue that I have not 
provided a significant alternative to causal-role functionalism because I have overstated the 
difference between Total T and the second-order interpretation of Causal T. In point of fact, 
some information about inter-level realization roles is recoverable from Causal T under its 
second-order interpretation. Specifically, one might argue that the physical underput properties 
P1 ... Pn enter the meta-theory of Causal T where they are assigned as the semantic value of the 
property variables that replace mental terms, and from this one can deduce psychophysical laws 
of the kind ‘necessarily, if P then M,’ at least given certain auxiliary assumptions that utilize a 
method of functional explanation.32 But, regardless, this piece of semantics plus the inferred 
property connection is hardly equivalent to theories of implementation science conjoined with 
the appropriate metaphysics supplied by a dimensioned property instantiation theory.  
First, the role-player property is not the same as the physical properties described within 
a dimensioned theory of property instantiation. Although it is differently ordered, the role-player 
property is possessed by the same individual and thus exists at the same mereological level as M, 
 17 
sharing its powers and thus occupying its role (recall the discussion of orders versus levels in 
section 1.). In contrast, the lower-level properties in a dimensioned theory are possessed by the 
component parts or susbsystems of the object that instantiates M, having different powers 
appropriate to the parts versus wholes. To reflect this difference, let the role-player property be 
designated as ‘N,’ and the lower-level properties of the component parts be designated as ‘P.’ 
Second, the functionalist view says only that a second-order property M is associated with a 
causal role and that a first-order physical property N plays that role. But this does not indicate 
how a token of the first-order role-player property N is able to occupy the causal role associated 
with the second-order functional property M. To understand that, one would need a deeper story 
about how the role-player N is itself determined via a dimensioned property instantiation theory, 
as illustrated below:  
 
Flat Causal Theory  




Dimensioned Property Instantiation Theory  
Causal level n-1: instantiation of more basic properties P1-Pn by component parts p1-pn  
 
The causal level n describes a pattern of relations of the kind causal-role functionalists 
use to define their target property M of a system s, in the philosophy of mind, the intra-level 
causal transitions between types of inputs, internal computations, and behavioral outputs. This 
causal-level also includes occupier properties like N since they play the causal role of functional 
properties like M. Causal level n-1 then describes a pattern of relations of the kind that exist 
between the mereological parts of the system s and determine its powers by the contributions of 
the several powers of the properties P1-Pn.  
To add some flesh to these bones, on this larger picture there is a particular computational 
system s of engineering components that is token identical with a mind and which displays an 
engineering role-player property N, say, having a structure of logic gates, that subserves the 
mind’s computational property M, say, performing addition. The computer system is the object 
within the domain computer engineering that possesses the complex structural property of logic 
gates, not the individual component circuits, but it does so by virtue of the capacities of the 
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several component circuits that combine to form the system of logic gates. So the computer 
system’s role-playing structure of logic gates N is explained by the accumulative powers of the 
more basic properties P1-Pn of the engineering components p1-pn in a mereologically 
dimensioned way.  
Now my point is that any causally flat metaphysics which says only that M has a role-
player logic-gate property N is absolutely silent about how that kind of property is able to occupy 
this role, because it is silent about how the more basic parts p1-pn and their properties P1-Pn 
compose the system s and thus determine its properties (in their orders) N and M. For that one 
needs a dimensioned property instantiation theory -- the mereology and the laws connecting the 
parts to the wholes -- along with the empirical nuts and bolts supplied by the appropriate 
implementation sciences. 33 In short, all this dimensioned information is contained in Total T, not 
Causal T, even on its second-order interpretation. So, regarding the vertical slice of realization 
roles, Total T is informationally rich while Causal T is impoverished. 
 Third Concern: Domains of Discourse. Finally, some believe that Causal T is a general 
theory of mind that ranges over human and nonhuman cognitive systems, while others believe it 
is a species-specific theory that explains just one of several kinds of minds. Likewise, I believe 
one can develop Total T either as a general or a species-specific theory. Various cognitive 
theories extend beyond the human species, like Milner and Goodale’s two systems theory of 
vision, or Feigenson, Dehaene, and Spelke’s theory of exact and approximate core systems for 
counting. 34 Exactly how far Total T extends beyond the human species is an empirical question 
that must be answered by scientific investigation. But there are problems that follow species-
specific and general interpretations of Total T, and they are worth addressing.  
On the one hand, one might think that a species-specific interpretation spells trouble 
because it results in a reductive theory, contrary to my exposition of Total T. For example, Lewis 
and Kim have both argued that species-specific properties yield species-specific psycho-physical 
identities. 35 Yet I reject the idea that a species-specific theory is ipso facto a reductive theory. 
Mental properties can be multiple realized by physical underput properties within various 
species, even within the same individuals at different times. The case of neural plasticity within 
the mammalian brain is well-documented, and the development of artificial neural implants 
provides compelling evidence that the same macrofunctional information values can be carried 
out by processes that exhibit quite different micro-causal profiles.  36 
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On the other hand, one might think that a more general interpretation of Total T also 
spells trouble because it will contain wildly disparate and heterogeneous physical realizations 
represented under its physical underput terms. Yet the appeal to heterogeneous physical 
realizations is only thought to be a problem when it is conjoined with objectionable reductive 
claims, for example, that a mental property is identical to a disjunction of otherwise 
heterogeneous physical properties. 37 But Total T is an explicit nonreductive theory in the sense 
that it exhibits the distinct nomic roles of mental and physical properties, and the nomic-role 
nonreductionist need not accept any further identities based upon constructivist ideas about 
physical properties picked out by disjunctions of physical terms. So, in summary, I think Total T 
represents a coherent theory, and the corresponding philosophy of nomic-role nonreductionism 
represents a viable position in the philosophy of mind. 
 
V. EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF COMPREHENSIVE PROFILING 
 
Thus far I have framed the discussion in terms of a contrast between two theories of mind, 
causal-role functionalism and nomic-role nonreductionism. But each view arguably presupposes 
a general theory of property identity. Causal profiling presents the relational nature of mental 
properties by intra-level causal roles. So it is plausible to assume that there is a causal theory of 
properties in the background. Comprehensive profiling presents the relational nature of mental 
properties by total nomic roles. So it is plausible to assume that there is a broader nomic theory 
of properties in the background. I want to finish by making some suggestions about such general 
matters. 
Part of the metaphysical duty of a property is to contribute to an object’s causal powers. 
This has led many philosophers to embrace a causal theory of properties. On such a view, (C) 
properties are the same if and only if they contribute the same causal powers to their instances. 38 
Sydney Shoemaker, who has developed this idea with considerable care, explains that they are 
conditional powers in the sense that are based upon the condition that the system has other 
properties with other powers, and in his more recent formulations the conditional causal powers 
include both forward-looking and backward-looking dimensions. 39 The causal theory of 
properties is thus closely linked to the causal-role functionalist’s method of causal profiling by a 
an intra-level transition theory framed in terms of backward-looking causes and forward-looking 
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effects, and it implies that method with the aid of auxiliary assumptions about the connection 
between causal powers and causal laws. Properties are identified by the network of causal laws 
into which they enter.  
But causal powers are not the only important features that properties possess. Being 
mindful of realization roles, properties also have upward-looking and downward-looking 
dimensions as well. Accordingly, I submit that another duty of a property is to contribute 
realization capacities to its instances. Intuitively, while the forward-looking dimension concerns 
how a property’s instantiation can cause things, and the backward-looking dimension concerns 
how a property’s instantiation can be caused by things, the upward-looking dimension concerns 
how a property’s instantiation can realize things, and the downward-looking dimension concerns 
how a property’s instantiation can be realized by things. I have explained realization roles in 
terms of a Cummins-style property instantiation theory under a Gillett-style interpretation of 
causal powers for the objects and their component parts. So my observation is that a property not 
only bestows causal powers on its instances to bring about certain effects (and to be the effect of 
certain causes), it also bestows realization capacities on its instances to be composed of parts 
with a specific organization (and to be itself a part of some still higher-level composite). 40 
The expanded principle is thus (T): properties are the same if and only if they contribute 
the same causal powers and realization capacities to their instances. This theory of properties is 
closely linked to the nomic-role nonreductionist’s method of comprehensive profiling by a 
theory of total nomic roles, and it implies that method with the aid of auxiliary assumptions 
about the connection between the powers/capacities and laws. Properties are identified by the 
larger network of nomic connections into which they enter. Accordingly, this theory of property 
identity is also supported by considerations about what is the more complete and comprehensive 
theory of mind as well the similarity between causation and realization with respect to matters of 
metaphysical production, as discussed in section 3. I like to think this proposal represents the 
kind of holism about properties that Quine would have accepted, had he accepted properties.  
But do I think Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is false? 41 Shoemaker in effect 
proposes that no two properties can endow their instances with exactly the same causal powers. I 
am in effect proposing that no two properties can endow their instances with exactly the same 
causal powers and realization capacities. If I do not think Shoemaker’s principle is false, why 
offer the stated expansion on causal powers? My answer is that, if the properties are understood 
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aright, Shoemaker’s principle is true but not the whole truth. Stated purely in terms of intra-level 
causal relations, it represents an incomplete description of the true facts about causal powers.  
The complete story represented by (T) is already implicit in some of Shoemaker’s 
remarks. For example, when illustrating the conditional power of a knife to cut wood, 
Shoemaker spoke about its being “made of steel.” He said: 
 
A knife-shaped object has the power of cutting wood conditionally upon being 
knife-sized and made of steel; for it is true of knife-shaped things, but not of 
things in general, that if they are knife-sized and made of steel they will have the 
power to cut wood. 42  
 
But being made of steel is a compositional matter, which is to say, the downward-looking 
dimension of a realization role. So the knife’s causal powers are also conditional upon the right 
kind of engineering (play knives made out of paper or soft plastic cannot cut wood). They are 
multi-level conditional powers. This view also makes perfect sense when one remembers how, as 
Cummins put it: “property theories and transition theories fit together in an important way when 
target properties are dispositional.” 43 With a causal disposition, there is a precipitating event 
causing a manifestation, which is a causal-state transition. But that causal disposition also 
decomposes into the level of physical mechanisms. The mechanisms thus ground the causal 
capacity, which is why a real cutting knife’s causal powers are conditional upon the appropriate 
range of physical compositions and their mode of organization. Moreover, the causal powers and 
realization capacities work in tandem. A real cutting knife cannot cut wood without the 
application of an outside force, such as the movement of a hand. Causal dispositions need a 
precipitating event. Put in nomic terms, multi-level conditional powers means multi-level laws: if 
an object possesses a suitable physical or engineering type of underput, and it receives a suitable 
type of causal input, then it must possess the realized property and all that follows.   
So I think a theory based upon causal powers and realization capacities gives the 
complete picture of property identity. The world is a fabric of intra-level and inter-level relations, 
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NOTES 
1 Regarding presentation, some use first-order logic with mixed quantification where variables 
range over both individuals and their properties (Block, 1980, pp.174-176), while others use 
second-order logic with individual variables for objects and predicate variables for properties 
(Shoemaker, 1982). I choose the latter. For those unfamiliar with the method, one generates the 
existentially quantified Ramsey sentence ‘∃F1 ... ∃Fn [T(I1 ... In, F1 ... Fn, O1 ... On)]’ from the 
stated Ramsey postulate by replacing all mental terms with existential quantifiers and property 
variables. One then constructs a set of predicates for each property variable in the Ramsey 
sentence, such as ‘∃F1 ... ∃Fn [T(I1 ... In, F1 ... Fn, O1 ... On) and x has Fi].’ Each predicate 
expresses the possession of a specific property, here the property associated with the ith term in 
the theory T (‘Mi’ in the Ramsey postulate and ‘Fi’ in the Ramsey sentence). One then defines 
mental properties accordingly. Second-order functionalists typically use property abstraction. 
Following Block, where ‘λxFx’ means ‘the property of being an x such that x is F,’ the resulting 
definition would be: ‘x has Mi = λx ∃F1 ... ∃Fn [T(I1 ... In, F1 ... Fn, O1 ... On) and x has Fi.’ See 
Block (1980, pp.174-179) and Horgan (1984). So second-order mental properties are certain 
properties of individuals defined by property abstraction over the physical properties that meet 
the condition of occupying the roles described in T. For discussion of various technical problems 
associated with the Ramsey method, see Field (1978, p.91 and fn. 23), Horgan (1984, pp.326-
327), and David (1997, pp.144-146). 
2 Putnam (1967, p.434); Lewis (1972, p.212); Block (1978, p.272), and Shoemaker (1982, 93). 
Parenthetically, in saying that second-order functionalists are nonreductive physicalists, I 
exclude certain nonstandard interpretations of the second-order language. For example, Kim 
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employs the language of second-order functionalism coupled with a deflationary interpretation 
whereby “the property of having property P” picks out the same property as “the property P” 
(1998, p.99). Thus he is a nominal second-order functionalist but a metaphysical first-order 
functionalist.     
3  Edward Tolman (1948) and Noam Chomsky (1965). Chomsky is now interested in a larger 
picture of language that incorporates data collected from the relevant areas of neuroscience and 
animal cognition. See Mark Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and Tecumsch Fitch (2002). 
4 Block (1995, pp.385-386). 
5  Gillett (2002, pp. 317-318). I present the theories of flat and dimensioned realization in terms 
of properties, which fits nicely with the idea of multiple realization. Gillett presents the flat and 
dimensioned theories in terms of property instances, which others find problematic. See Polger 
and Shapiro (2008).   
6  Gillett (2003, p. 593).  
7 See Kim (1998, pp. 82-86). 
8 This is a substantive assumption, and I thank John Bickle for reminding me to acknowledge it. 
Nonreductionist positions that are based upon standard Putnam-Fodor style considerations about 
multiple realizability have been the focus of lively criticism. See Bechtel and Mundale (1999), 
Bickle (2003), Shapiro (2004), and Polger (2004). For considerations that multiple realizability 
can be sustained, though shorn of the traditional assumptions about abstract cognitive theory and 
top-only methodology, see Keeley (2000), Gillett (2003), Van Eck, Looren de Jong, and 
Schouten (2006), and Aizawa (2007, and forthcoming). 
9 For some basic ideas about multiple realization, see Endicott (2005). 
10 A classic example is Raymond Cattell’s multivariate theory of sixteen primary traits, which 
other researchers then grouped under five higher-level traits. See Cattell (1957), Cattell, et. al. 
(1970), and Norman (1963). So there are three explicit levels of ontology in this approach to 
personality theory -- a “personality” that decomposes into “five global traits” that themselves 
decompose into “sixteen primary traits.” Of course these in turn must be realized by still lower-
level mechanisms. 
11 For the standard sufficient conditions view, see Lepore and Loewer (1989, p.179); Kim (1996, 
p.133). For the INUS conditions view, see Endicott (1994, pp.68-69). Specifically, my 
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suggestion is that realizing properties that occur within laws like ‘P1 => M1’ must include an 
additional realization-base condition P2 such that a difference in P2 allows P1 to determine some 
other property M2 but not M1 (the converse of multiple realizability). Let this be represented by 
the realization law “(P1 & P2) => M1.” If M1 is multiply realized by properties other than the joint 
pair P1 and P2, then the pair is not necessary, meaning that P1 is an INUS condition -- an 
insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.   
12 See Horgan (1993) and Wilson (2001). 
13 Mellor (1991, p.112). 
14 Cummins (1983). 
15 Aping the Ramsified functionalist scheme, the corresponding Ramsey predicate for Total T is: 
(N) ‘x has Mi, = the Fi such that ∃ F1 ... ∃ Fn [T(P1 ... Pn, I1 ... In, F1 ... Fn, O1 ... On, V1 ... Vn) 
and x has Fi].’ As I go on to explain in the text, this is not a second-order position about the 
mental property. The right-hand side does not mean the (second-order) property of having the 
condition that is specified by the entire Ramsey formula. Accordingly, a “first-order” property in 
this context does not mean a physical property, only a property that is not defined over other 
properties by the method of property abstraction (see fn. 1). As well, “order” does not mean 
“level,” as discussed previously (section 1.). On the view sketched here, a mental property 
remains higher-level vis-à-vis the properties of the physical sciences but first-order in the sense 
that it is not defined over other properties by the method of property abstraction.  
16 Bealer (1997, pp.75-7, fn.8), with a slight change in the terms. Bealer continues by saying that 
“the way around these problems is, presumably, to confine T to a description of the 
characteristic interaction of the standard mental properties with one another and macroscopic 
physical properties (loc. cit), meaning, in present terminology, that functionalists who assign 
first-order physical properties to the property variables that replace mental terms can avoid 
contradiction by employing the more restricted Causal T, since it omits the distinct inter-level 
realization roles whose inclusion would conflict with physical occupation.  
17 Milner and Goodale (2006). In the Epilogue to this second edition, Milner and Goodale 
discuss various developments in neuroscience that have occurred in the intervening years, most 
notably the use of fMRI on human subjects, which further confirm their hypothesis about ventral 
and dorsal streams underlying the perception and action systems. See also Jacob (2005). 
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18 See Zecki (1993) and Prinz (2005). Two points of clarification are in order. First, Prinz 
follows Jackendorff (1987) and many others in viewing the perceptual system in terms of an 
organized hierarchy, where different subsystems represent perceptual features at different levels 
of abstraction. This begins with very fine-grained and specific visual features (like points in a 
primal sketch) and ends with very course-grained abstract representations that are invariant 
across perceptual vantage points (like the 3D outline of a body), with the intermediate-level 
subsystems located in the middle with representations of the kind one is consciously aware with 
details that are vantage point specific rather then invariant (2005, p.382). So in this context 
“levels” refers to a perceptual level of abstraction in visual processing, not a metaphysical level 
of properties. Second, although Prinz presents his theory of consciousness as a functional theory 
(ibid., p. 390), he grounds intermediate-level processing in areas V2-V5 (ibid., p. 384), and 
working memory in the frontal and temporal cortexts (ibid., p. 388). His theory is thus inter-level 
by addressing both ‘what’ and ‘where’ questions about consciousness.   
19 The role of realizing mechanisms is also indirectly implied by niche-dependent cognition, as 
described in Clark (1997, pp. 23-25). See also Varela, Thompson, and Rosche (1991).  
20  Gillett (2002, p. 322; 2003, pp. 598-599). 
21  Cummins (1983, p.15). 
22  Fodor (1968) and Cummins (1975). 
23 See Kim (1998, 84-86). 
24 Smart (1959, p.160) and Lewis (1972, p.212). 
25 See Gopnik and Metzloff  (1997) and the discussion by Margolis and Lawrence (1999).  
26 I thank Eric Funkhouser for requesting clarification about the use of theories in this context. 
My argument in the text that generalizes from causal roles to realization roles is also meant to 
address why a theory that expresses a mental property’s total nomic role should be taken to 
reveal the nature of the properties in question.  
27 Among philosophers, Andy Clark (1997, 2001) provides a clear expression of the more liberal, 
ecumenical spirit I have in mind. Owen Flanagan (1992) also defends a form of liberalism with 
his “natural method” wherein the deliverances of phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and 
neuroscience are brought into reflective equilibrium. Patricia Churchland gives a nice summary 
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of the broader methodologies: “top-down strategies (as characteristic of philosophy, cognitive 
psychology, and artificial intelligence research) and bottom-up strategies (as characteristic of the 
neurosciences) for solving the mysteries of mind-brain function should not be pursued in icy 
isolation from one another. What is envisaged instead is a rich interanimation between the two, 
which can be expected to provoke a fruitful co-evolution of theories, models, and methods, 
where each informs, corrects, and inspires the other” (1986, p.3). But Churchland’s view 
illustrates that not all methodological liberals accept nonreductionism. She believes that if a 
higher-level theory is not eliminated, it will eventually co-evolve with a lower-level theory until 
the two reach “reductive consummation” (ibid., p.264). Yet compare Robert McCauley (1996), 
who argues that the co-evolution of inter-level theories may result in a stable equilibrium. See 
also Endicott (2007, p.165), who adds that the process of theoretical co-evolution may only 
converge to the point of token identities, which allows for partial reduction and mechanistic 
explanation.  
28 My remarks are compatible with the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). 
For example, a calculator may count as an item of direct mental production by virtue of its 
feedback and control activities that allow it to be coupled with the brain as part of the larger 
brain+calculator system.  
29 I do not think my generalization argument is affected if one rejects the idea that causation 
implies determination and covering laws. For example, those who favor statistical versions of 
causation reject the aspect of determination. But the move to statistical laws can be made for a 
theory of realization as well. So I can still argue that insofar as coverage by statistical laws 
makes ‘causes’ a significant item for inclusion in a theory of mind-defining essence, the same 
point can be made about ‘realizations.’ In any case, for views that realization implies 
determination via covering laws, see Kim (1981/1993, p. 180; 1996, p.133), Lepore and Loewer 
(1989, p.179), and Tye (1995, p.41). Parenthetically, this metaphysical tradition contrasts with 
logical and mathematical traditions of realization, where the idea of lawful determination is 
absent. See Endicott (2005). 
30 I thank Brian McLaughlin for raising this issue in correspondence. 
31 See Endicott (2005). 
32 See Levine (1993) and Chalmers (1996).  
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33 Elsewhere I plan to describe in much more detail how a dimensioned theory of realization 
complements a flat functionalist theory of roles and occupants.  
34 Feigenson, Dehaene, and Spelke (2004). 
35 See Lewis (1969) and Kim (1972, 1992). Others replied by arguing that a species-specific 
reduction will miss important psychological generalizations, and I argued that postulating more 
narrow individual-time-relative mental properties makes the reductive proposal indistinguishable 
from a token identity thesis. See Endicott (1993, p.315). 
36 For the much cited case of compensatory plasticity from neural damage or experimental 
intervention, see Rauschecker (1995), Von Melchner, Pallas, and Sur (2000) and Sur (2001). For 
experience-dependent plasticity where the brain acquires different neural wiring through learning 
and environment, see King (1999). For the development of artificial neural implants, see Berger 
and Glanzman (2005). For an interesting counter to multiple realizability arguments based upon 
these considerations, see Shapiro (2004). Thus, concerning Sur’s cross-modal experiments that 
result in auditory areas acquiring visual functions, Shapiro argues that the before and after cases 
count as the same kind of physical realization because there is no difference concerning the 
causal mechanisms by which those neural processing areas perform the visual function, and 
similarly for cases of neuron-to-chip replacement (2004, 56-65). But Shapiro has stated in 
conversation that he no longer finds the argument convincing, since it turns on metaphysical 
disagreements over how fine-grained or course-grained the appropriate description of the causal 
mechanisms should be. For the continued debate over multiple realizability, see the references in 
footnote 8.  
37 Fodor (1974/1981) and Block (1997). 
38 Shoemaker (1980). 
39 Shoemaker (1998).  
40 In correspondence, Robert Cummins suggested a nice way to put the point about parity, which 
I relay near verbatim. If we ask what intellectual role property identity plays, the answer often 
involves considerations that one can get the same effect by substituting one mechanism for 
another, a whosis for a widget, where ‘effect’ means something like a robust regularity, as in the 
Stroop Effect, or the photoelectric effect. Effects are thus dispositional properties subject to a 
dimensioned property analysis. So it seems right to say that E cannot be the same effect as E* if 
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there is a way of realizing E that is not a way of realizing E*. But this seems as compelling as 
the idea that P and P* must be different if there is a way of causing x to have P but not P*. 
41 I thank Brian McLaughlin for raising this question in correspondence. 
42 Shoemaker (1980/1984, p. 213).  
43  Cummins (1983, p. 21). 
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